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Situated action in the development
of activity
Pascal Béguin and Yves Clot
ERRATA
An anomaly during the automatic migration of all texts published in 2015 to the
current e-platform resulted in a reversal of the names of the authors of the paper
entitled "Situated action in the development of activity”. This error has now been fixed
(December 2020). The editorial board wishes to apologize to the authors and readers for
this mistake. 
1 What do situated action theories contribute to activity theories? This debate is already
well underway in international literature (see for example, Nardi, 1996 or Engeström,
1999).  We will  conduct the  debate  based on relations  between the  functioning and
development of activity. We have discussed these relations elsewhere (Clot, 2004). In
this article we will tackle it from the perspective of situated action. Relations between
the functioning and development of activities are interesting for two reasons. First
they allow us to hold the discussion based on a question common to Soviet activity
theories  (as  they  were  initially  developed  by  Vygotski,  Leontiev  and  Bakhtin),  the
French-speaking approach in psychology (Wallon, Piaget, etc.) and ergonomics (where
the notion of activity is almost synonymous with inventiveness). Second, we feel it is
urgent to clarify relations between the given and the created in activity, both in work
psychology (Clot, 1999; Clot, & Faïta, 2000) and ergonomics (Béguin, & Cerf, 2003).1
2 However,  there  is  a  profusion  of  situated  approaches:  they  contain  references  to
philosophy  (pragmatic,  phenomenological),  to  sociology  (Chicago  School  and
ethnomethodology,  social  phenomenology),  to  anthropology  (particularly  cognitive
anthropology), to psychology or engineering sciences (including artificial intelligence).
Yet first we will try to find our way, even briefly, around situated cognition and action
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theories (without by any means claiming exhaustiveness). Thereafter, we will discuss
relations between the given and the created.
 
1. Situating the organization of action
3 Situated cognition and action approaches aim to provide a theory for the organization
of action, rather than to characterize a particular type of action2.  More specifically,
debates  concern  relations of  determination  between  the  subject  and  the  situation,
between the internal and the external:  where should we situate the organization of
action? Conein and Jacopin (1994) argue that in situated movements, the “organization
of  action  is  understood  as  a  system  emerging  in  situ  from  the  dynamic  of 
interactions”  (p  476).  What  should  we  understand  by  the  term  “dynamic  of
interactions”?  And  what  does  “emerging”  mean?  Clearly,  we  can  identify  different
answers and even different traditions. We will distinguish three3. The first, which we
will call “interactionist” mostly originates in sociology. The second, qualified here as
“ecological”,  is  more  directly  grounded in  psychology.  The  third,  qualified  here  as
“cultural”, is close to cognitive anthropology.
 
1.1. The interactionist approach
4 When discussing interest in the situation within the organization of action, one often
refers to Goffman: we cannot treat situation like a country cousin. Usage of a word,
however,  is  not enough to ensure the problem is tackled with precision.  It  is  more
exactly defining situation by means of interactions (and even one-to-one interactions)
that interest  Goffman. Indeed,  when participants are in immediate physical  contact
with  one  another,  they  contribute  together  to  the  same  global  definition of  the
situation (Goffman, 1959). This acceptance of the notion of situation, inherited from
symbolic interactionism,  is  not  common  in  ergonomics  or  psychology:  why  define
situation as being born of “interaction”?
5 The answer probably comes from the history of sociology, particularly in the debate
that opposes functionalist sociology (Durkheim or Parsons) and interpretive sociology
(one of whose leaders is H.G. Mead). While functionalist sociology argues that social
structures  weigh on the  behavior  of  each person via  the  restrictive  role  of  norms,
interpretive sociology insists on society being produced by agents’ behavior.
6 Symbolic  interactionism in  particular  “understands  society  to  be  something that  is
lived here and now, in the face-to-face and mediated interactions that connect persons
to another […] Society, like interaction, is an emergent phenomenon” (Denzin, 1992,
pp. 22-23). Social structures undergo interpretation and social order is the product of
well-ordered improvisation (Mead, 1934). Individuals thus create the world in which
they  live  via  their  interactions  (Blumer,  1969).  Ethnomethodology takes  this
interactionist position further. The hypothesis of positivist sociology, which claims that 
we act in response to an objectively given social world, is replaced by the hypothesis
that says our everyday social practices make the world mutually intelligible: to make
sense of the everyday world, subjects have methods at their disposal. These methods
are  the  object  of  ethnomethodology, and  the  theoretical  background  for  Suchman
(1987), who was the first (to our knowledge) to put forward the term “situated action”.
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1.1.1. From plan to situated action
7 While Suchman’s interactionist approach is situated above all in the field of sociology,
her work is interesting precisely because it is not limited to this. Quite the contrary,
Suchman draws a parallel between the norms of functionalist sociology and the plans of
cognitive  computational  psychology. Both  suppose  the  existence  of  potentially
countless  background affirmations  and presuppositions,  to  which our  attitudes  and
actions respond. However, Suchman affirms that neither of them manages to account
for the carrying out of action.
8 Indeed, when one produces experimental situations during which subjects are asked to
provide these background affirmations, we realize that they are not available and, on
the contrary, they must be produced. Suchman deduces that the plan is engendered in
the rational field to account for action but it is not at all necessary for its realization.
All  the  more  so  because  no  matter  how  much  the  agent plans  and  envisages
alternatives to choose from at each stage, accomplishing action cannot be the simple
execution of a plan. It is necessary to adapt to circumstances, deal with contingencies,
and act at the right time in seizing favorable opportunities. Thus, writes Suchman: “I
have introduced the term situated action.. That term underscores the view that every
course of action depends in essential ways upon its material and social circumstances.
Rather than attempting to abstract action away from its circumstances and represent it
as  a  rational  plan,  the approach is  to study how people use their  circumstances to
achieve intelligent action” (Suchman, 1987, p. 50).
9 In short, the plan is either a resource (when it is produced before the action) that plays
an  orienting  role  (she  takes  the  example  of  a  kayakist  who  plans  to  undertake  a
particular action when he/she reaches a given marker), or is produced afterwards, a
reconstruction sui generis that aims to take action as an object of reflection after it is
carried out4. It does not account for action under way. Effective action emerges from
circumstances”.
 
1.1.2. From carrying out action to its construction in situation
10 If  we  cannot  account  for  the  carrying  out  of  action  based  on  existing  knowledge
(cognitive computational psychology’s plans or functionalist sociology’s norms) what
does allow us to account for it?
11 Suchman looks to verbal communication for the prototype of a contextual approach to
action in line with Schutz’s position, according to which our shared understanding of
situations  is  largely  due  to the  efficiency  of  language,  “the  typifying  medium  par
excellence”. Two dimensions account for the contextualization of action: “indexicality
of language” and “reflexivity of purposeful action”.
12 Indexicality  of  language  refers  to  the  fact  that  an  expression  takes  on meaning  in
circumstances, in what is presupposed (an expression such as “big apple” means New
York if we use it when in Manhattan) or in what is perceived or indicated (as is the case
in the usage of deictics – personal pronouns and time, place or demonstrative adverbs).
Indexicality thus refers to the fact that language has a strong contextual dependence
that subjects exploit5. Reflexivity of purposeful action means that language defines the
frame of the action. Situated language is not only grounded in, but largely constitutes,
the  situation  of  its  use.  In  contrast  with  a  normative  paradigm  (where  language
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vehicles given social conventions) language creates and sustains shared understanding
on specific occasions of interaction.
13 Finally, in Suchman approach, saying that action emerges from circumstances means
two  things:  action  is  dependent  on  circumstances  (this  is  indexicality)  and  acting
defines the context of action (this is reflexivity). However, the dynamic of interactions
is essentially language-based. Enunciation allows it  to be grounded in the situation.
Enunciation  also  defines  the  frame  of  action.  While  speaking  contextualizes  and
situates action in the situation, it remains to be seen where situated approaches place
the organization of action when verbal interactions play a minor role in its effective 
application.
 
1.2. The ecological approach: practical thought
14 Suchman’s position can be considered as phenomenological: one needs to identify the
properties of action before it has been converted into an object in the rational field
(anticipated before the fact, or reconstructed afterwards). However, this approach does
not cover the whole field of situated action. Other movements fit into a perspective
that can be described as “ecological”,  insofar as some of the tasks [particularly the
cognitive  tasks,  which  can  lead  to  talk  not  of  situated  action  but  rather,  situated
cognition (Conein, & Jacopin, 1994)] are transferred to the environment.
15 The ecological approach was born of doubts on the validity of experimental situations
to account for thought in situations of daily life. We could thus distinguish an academic
or  theoretical  thought mode  [see  Neisser  (1976),  who  defines  AI,  half-joking,  half-
serious, as Academic Intelligence] and a practical thought mode (Scribner, 1986), whose
specificity lies in the fact that it is finalized6.
16 We  will  use  work  analysis  conducted  by  Beach  (1993)  to  exemplify  the  ecological
approach. The author looks at strategies used by cafe waiters to memorize customer
orders. These waiters use the positions of glasses (empty or full) on the bar, as well as
clues  on  the  customers’  tables  (position  or state  of  coasters)  to  memorize  certain
elements of customer orders. However, “integrating the environment into the problem
solving system” is not immediate. Beach observes that the operators first use verbal
clues. And as expertise gradually develops, barmen use information available in the
environment more and more. Scribner indicated the interpretation of such findings by
writing, “If experts in a domain use the environment more (or more effectively) than
novices […] models of thinking that can only deal with the world as represented in the
head may find analysis  of  many practical  thinking problems intractable” (Scribner,
1986, p 25). Becoming expert means exploiting environmental resources.
17 In the ecological approach, “situated” means that part of the action organization is
taken care of by the environment. Nonetheless, several versions are possible. We can
look to the environment for elements that orient and structure the subject’s action, or
on the contrary, explore how the subject exploits the environment.
 
1.2.1. Grounding action
18 Speaking  of  grounding  action  means  that  representations  are  placed  and  made
available  in  the  physical  world.  This  movement  draws  above  all  from  Gibson’s
ecological  psychology  (1979).  The  central idea  is  that  we  directly  perceive  the
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functional value of objects and their practical signification: what should be done, the
risks or  obstacles.  This  is  the notion of  affordance,  interested in perception, which
postulates economic mechanisms in information processing (the notion of affordance is
in fact  borrowed  from  K.  Lewin  and  Gestalt;  we  will  come  back  to  this  point).
Affordances are characterized as follows:
The object is significant; this signification is linked to perceptual experience (particularly to 
traces left in later experiences).
An object is immediately associated with a signification for action.
19 Brooks (1991), for example, argues that experts hardly plan at all. They use skills and
rules of action that are grounded in the ability to distinguish perceptual clues. One can
thus speak of “routines”. A routine is situated because it exploits “what is at hand” for
action.  Rather  than  an  abstract  reasoning on  representations  of  the  world,  action
reaches the world directly by perception and manipulation. Such an approach deals
with the routine as “emerging from concrete activity”. (Chapman, & Agre, 1987).
20 “Routines”  highlight  a  difference  that  has  often  been  seen  as  fundamental  within
debates  opposing situated  action  approaches  and  cognitive  psychology.  The  latter
postulates  that  cognition  can  be defined  as  a  formal  manipulation  of  symbolic
representations. In the ecological approach, and particularly that most focused on the
notion of affordance, coupling occurs via perception or the carrying out of action. The
notion of symbolic treatment loses a good deal of its heuristic interest.
21 We will make two further remarks. In doing without the computational hypothesis, the
approach postulates doing without mechanisms for processing information: they are
transferred to the environment. For this reason, it interests many sectors, from studies
on  cognitive  burden  in  the  workplace  (Kirsh,  2001)  to  situated  approaches  in  A.I.
(where we speak of a “situated agent”, (Maes, 1990). Our second remark: this approach
has  been  qualified  as  spatial  (Conein,  &  Jacopin,  1994),  in that  action  is  grounded
thanks  to  representations  available  in  (physical  or  social)  space.  Nonetheless, the
temporal variable cannot be neglected insofar as the routine emerges from interaction
with the environment (Chapman, & Agre, 1987).
 
1.2.2. Handling the situation
22 Grounding  action  raises  debate  within  the ecological  approach.  Kirsh  (1995),  for
example, also starts with the idea that experts do not plan. But he adds another idea:
experts “jig” their environment. “Jigging is one way of preparing and structuring the
environment.  The more completely prepared the environment is,  the easier is  it  to
accomplish  one’s  task”  (Kirsh,  1995,  p  37).  This  scheme postulates  that  action  is
heterogeneous to an extent; part of action consists in attaining a goal, whereas another
part organizes the environment to adapt it to action. The process of structuring the
environment,  that  Hammond,  Converse  and  Grass  (1992)  call  “the  stabilization  of
environments”, constitutes an “active”, rather than a “reactive” dimension of action.
From our point of view, this position is very distinct from the preceding one because
action is active. Rather than exploiting available resources within the environment, the
subject  creates  resources  of  his/her  own action. Work by Scribner  (1986)  and Lave
(1988) will serve as examples here.
23 To account for the distinction between given and created, Lave suggests distinguishing
two elements in the situation: (i) the arena, which is the objective spatial environment;
• 
• 
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this is the “given” situation, (ii) the setting, i.e. the situation constructed as a result of
the subject’s activity; this is the situation as a product of activity. In a supermarket, for
example,  the  arena  is  defined  by  the  position of  articles  on  the  shelves  and  the
organization of  these  shelves  as  determined by  marketing  managers.  However,  the
setting is  defined by the space really explored by a customer (who is  the object  of 
strategies, because not all sections are visited), how the products are arranged in the
trolley (which, as Lave demonstrates, can act as a memory support), by the shopping
list, etc. In this example, part of the organization of action is effectively delegated to
the characteristics of the situation, but it concerns the part of the situation created by
the subject’s activity.
24 Scribner (1986) also argues that properties of the environment play a role in practical
problem solving. Hence, for milkmen in England, the physical state of the milk crates –
empty or full – or their spatial positions – storage organization – all play a functional
role: these variables allow the solving of complex problems of counting and calculating.
But  the  state  of  the  environment  is  not  given  in the  work.  She  stresses  that  the
properties of situation take on a functional role due to the initiative and constructive
activity of the person solving the problem. In “constructive activity”, the subject makes
the situation meet and conform to the needs of his/her action.
 
1.3. Artifacts and culture
25 The cultural approach, which we will essentially illustrate with research by Hutchins7,
shares a certain number of points with the ecological approach, in particular through
the notion of “affordance” and “cognitive artifacts” developed by Norman.
26 From affordance, Norman (1994) retains the idea that objects serve to control action.
“Cognitive artifacts” clarify control’s focus. Some artifacts serve to represent action
(they  aim  to  facilitate  manipulation  and  execution),  others  serve  as  informational
supports for action (they facilitate memory and symbol processing)8.
27 Hutchins’ research is part of the same movement, yet is different in two ways. First,
cognitive  artifacts  may  not  be  disconnected  from  cultural  variables.  Second,  he
generalizes the approach to groups.  This  is  the distributed cognition movement.  In
principle, it is possible to do a double reading of this movement (to which the author
himself contributed): cognitive or cultural.
28 In the cognitive approach, cognition is apprehended as a functional system, made up of
a person and artifacts, as well as their relations. The components of such a system are
defined  by  their  capacity  to vehicle  representational  states.  Hence,  Hutchins  and
Klausen  (1992)  analyze  the  cockpit  as  a  “cognitive  system”,  where  knowledge
representation is both in “subjects’ heads” and in artifacts, where the representational
states propagate via different media. Flor and Hutchins (1991) write that “By studying
cognitive  phenomena  in  this  fashion  it  is  hoped  that  an  understanding  of  how
intelligence is manifested at the systems level, as opposed to the individual cognitive
level, will be obtained.”(Flor, & Hutchins, p 37). This change in unit of analysis (from
individual  to  a  broader  system)  is  perhaps necessary.  But  to  get  there,  distributed
cognition places cognitive artifacts and subjects on the same level. Both are understood
as supports for information processing. Hence a criticism often leveled at distributed
cognition is that it postulates an equivalence between subject and object (Nardi, 1996). 
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We share this criticism. Such reductionism seems not very heuristic and difficult to
support in a research perspective.
29 The second reading, developed in Cognition in the Wild (Hutchins, 1995), is cultural. We
consider two points as central:
The  first  point:  human  cognitive  capacities  cannot  be  disconnected  from  their  natural
milieu, which is in reality largely artificial as well as culturally and historically determined.
Furthermore, many of these cultural environments fall within the domain of knowledge of
practices  that  language  has  difficulty  accessing.  Here,  we  come  back  to  the  idea  that
cognition is  inseparable from cultural  productions.  This position,  which is  also held,  for
example, by Olson (1980), does not eliminate a priori the importance of human cognition.
However, it considers that cognition is solicited differently depending on the technologies
available.  For example, memory is  solicited differently based on whether or not  writing
exists. Hutchins stresses elsewhere that cognitive technologies form a system (artifacts are
coherent  among themselves,  and cognitive tasks  imposed on subjects  are coherent  with
artifact systems).
Point  two:  “The  real  power  of  human cognition  lies  in  our  ability  to  flexibly  construct
functional  systems  that  accomplish  our  goals  by  bringing  bits  of  structure  into
coordination” (Hutchins, 1995, p 316). What does Hutchins mean? First, there is a division of
tasks: each person is responsible for local processing that cannot be understood without
reference to the whole.
30 But above all, this division of tasks is not rigid: there are different architectures. “The
group,” he writes “can be seen as a computational architecture.” As a result, different
architectures will have different effects. Hence, certain structures attempt to reduce
production of alternative interpretations (they facilitate the decision making process),
whereas  others,  on  the  contrary,  are  excessively  productive  and  render  decision
making impossible.
31 What does  “situated” mean in  this  cultural  approach to  distributed cognition? The
“situation”  does not  control  action.  For  Hutchins,  there  culturally  and  historically
situated (this is the case, for example, of navigating at sea, which Hutchins calls the
computational level, in reference to Marr). Nonetheless, action is situated in two ways:
On the execution of action level (and particularly on the information processing level), given
the distribution of cognitive artifacts i.e. informational media.
On the control of action level (i.e. definition of the goal) in that the definition of individual 
goals is dependent on the architecture of the group.
 
2. The given and the created
32 Now we need to attempt to evaluate the impact of the turnaround proposed by situated
action approaches.  On  several  aspects,  they  are  an  alternative  to  the  cognitivist
approach: insistence on analyses in real situations, limiting the functional role of plans,
questioning the formal manipulation of  symbolic  representation,  etc.  But above all,
they insist on action being determined by situational variables, which they inventory.
In doing so, they tend to replace subject psychology by situation psychology. As de
Fornel and Quéré would say, it is about “putting back into the environment what was
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33 And indeed, if we follow Hutchins, still in Cognition in the Wild, a great deal of behavior
organization is removed from the agent, and attributed to the structure of the object or
system  with  which  he/  she  coordinates  him/herself.  Such  is  the  meaning  of
“coordinate”: “to set oneself up in such a way that constraints on one’s behavior are
given by some other system” (1995, p. 200). In these conditions, de Fornel and Quéré
are correct in writing that in distributed cognition, “the control of the situated action
is due to an external instance, that takes the place of the mental pilot of rationalist 
models.” (1999, p. 28).
34 As we have just seen, not all situated action theories boil down to distributed cognition.
But we can find a common denominator: “What makes individual thought possible is
the existence of a stable environment of thoughts, conceptions, representations and
significations  that  are  nobody’s,  that,  in short,  come  from  an  “objective  spirit”
supported by society’s practices, customs and institutions.” (de Fornel, & Quéré, 1999,
p. 28). And in this perspective, after Gibson (1979), there is much stress placed on the
functionality  of  affordance  through  which  a  subject  detects  structural  invariants
corresponding  to  permanent  properties  of  the  environment.  Extraction  of  these
“socially supported” invariants can even be taken as automatic: “Anyone familiar with
the ways of doing and thinking in a culture, its customs, the objects and mechanisms it
uses, its techniques and methods, immediately and directly perceives the affordances
of  objects.”  (Quéré,  1999,  p. 318-319).  Thus  there  is  no  need, in  this  ecological
perspective,  to  hypothesize  about  a  mental  interface  between  the  subject  and  the 
world. There are “behavioral milieux”, in which are deposited “shared values, i.e. the
social rules that people give themselves and agree to follow because they make sense.”
(p. 334).  This “coupling between environment and behavior,  situation and conduct”,
contributes  to  “reduce  the  hold  of  the metaphysics  of  subjectivity  on  social
investigation.”  (de Fornel,  & Quéré,  1999,  p. 29).  At  the end of the day,  affordance,
artifacts or the structure of social groups are generally thought of as the invariant of
situated action. These situational invariants organize the subject’s conduct and activity.
35 This is a serious shift away from a planned and endogenous conception of action. And
for anyone interested, as we are, in the historical and cultural dimension of activities
and  their  resources,  theoretical  developments  of  “situated  action”  are  certainly
interesting. Even better, we can consider that they confirm our own analyses. We will
particularly recognize, in taking physical and social contexts into consideration, not
only a condition for action but also a constituting element of action.
36 Nonetheless, we will wonder what relation to establish between these given in advance
or pre-organized, stable forms of action operations and what we call the concept of
activity. Is not all activity situated precisely between the given and the created? Work
analysis familiarized us with the weight of what has already been decided, what is given
or “crystallized” in structures. But it also taught us that activity cannot be reduced to
execution  procedures  applied  more  or  less  passively.  Furthermore, even  the  most
repetitive  movement  of  a  production  line  worker  is  always  unique.  So,  we  can
understand why Vergnaud and Récopé, in a Piagetist perspective, could correctly write
that the scheme is not a stereotype: “What is invariant is the organization of activity,
not activity.” (Vergnaud, & Récopé 2000, p. 45).
37 This distinction seems essential to us: activity makes use of what is given in advance,
what is preorganized or crystallized and what we call by the generic term “invariants”
but  cannot  be confined to them: on the contrary,  activity  makes use of  invariants.
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Clearly,  situated action theories seek invariants in the situation,  rather than in the
subject as is the case in cognitive psychology. However, in arguing that the invariants
situated  in  situations  explain  activity,  situated  approaches  reduce  the  distinction
between the invariant, the already given, and the created in activity. As a result,  it
would appear to be more a shift than a turnaround in traditional cognitive psychology.
38 In the field of situated action, we will no doubt find convincing counter-examples, like
Laborde’s analyses on improvisation (1999), or those of Sribner (1986) and to a lesser
degree Lave (1988), which we referred to above. But the tendency of confining action to
the situation in which it takes place, and seeking control of action, both in its contents
and realization, is characteristic of “situated action”.
39 We  prefer  to  think  that  it  is  activity,  unique  at  every  occurrence,  that  must  be
confronted  with  situations  in  their  physical  and  social  components.  The  structural
invariants of situated action are surely the organizers of activity in situation. But they
are not the activity itself. Seen from this angle, it appears that situated action theories,
like the most cognitive of approaches to action, are not attentive enough to the benefits
that  can  be  drawn  from  the  distinction  between  functioning,  backed  up  by the
invariant, the already constructed or the given, and the development of invariants in
activity. 
 
3. Functioning and development
40 In attempting to repatriate  the subject  into the situation,  in reintegrating him/her
socially, situated cognition and action approaches clearly indicate a limit to cognitive
psychology, including those that are explicitly interested in development, like Piaget.
Pastré (2000) made this clear. While for Piaget development is vital, it is endogenous.
The milieu only has a secondary impact in the development of an epistemic subject
distanced from the “specific content” of action and which supposedly “develops all by
itself” (Pastré, 2000, p. 48). We can only wonder whether, to avoid abstractions of the
psychological subject,  situated approaches have not simply exported invariants into
the situation itself to de-psychologize them. In this case, they simply transferred them:
socialized,  “distributed”  and external  to  the  subject,  at  the  risk  of  eliminating  the
subject’s activity. This opens the door to a pure “situations logic” in the sense given by
Poppers: a method that consists in sufficiently analyzing the acting subject’s situation
so as to explain his/her action based on the situation. (Popper, 1979).
41 In short, on one hand we have an endogenous development of the subject but the place
of  situations is  unclear.  On  the  other,  we  have  an  exogenous  development  of  the
situation but the subject’s role is unclear. We put forward the hypothesis that situated
action theories  transpose  into  situations  what cognitive  psychology  situated in  the
subject, shifting the paradoxes without solving them. If this is the case, the announced
turnaround, even in making individual  activity obsolete,  even in purely and simply
reducing  subjectivity  to  intersubjectivity  (Valsiner,  1997;  Grossen,  2001),  would  be
more a pendulum movement than an effective alternative. This is not completely new
in  the  history  of  psychology.  We  can  only  be  struck  by  the  similarity  between
perspectives of situated action and those of Gestalt theory made famous by W. Köhler et
K. Lewin, as noted by Grossen (2001, p. 61). De Fornel and Quéré insist heavily on this
and go even further in this direction (de Fornel, & Quéré, 1999, pp. 14 and 25; Quéré,
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1999,  pp. 305  and  330).  But  as  we  will  see,  Wallon  had  already  criticized  this
epistemological pendulum back in 1942.
 
3.1. Subject and situation: a historical overview
42 The first two chapters of H. Wallon’s major publication, From Act to Thought, are devoted
to comparing “consciousness psychologies" and "situations psychology". In the former,
he  places  Piaget,  who  limits  application  to  the  individual  (1970,  p. 46).  He  notes:
“Despite his rigor, Piaget’s conception remains fairly eclectic. After initially presenting
motor schemes as essential and their individual activities, operating under the control
of experience, as the only factors in psychic development, he can then not avoid adding
global action.” (p. 35). This is development understood as a vital assimilation tendency.
Hence, “the subject’s and the situation’s points of view would have priority over that of
the constituent elements. But this is contrary to the explanation system proposed. The
principle  that  had  been  eliminated  in  the  premises  is  reintroduced  during  the
explanation.”  (p. 36).  And indeed  if  “the  motor  schemes  have  the  attributes  of
autonomous and conquering activity,” how do we “seize the moment where the subject
will finally emerge from the schemes?” Is the subject not “ultimately discovered there
because he/she was presupposed there”?
43 Wallon  then  examines  another  possibility:  “The  object  of  psychology  can  be  not  a
subject  but  a  situation”.  In  this  case,  “the  act  is  considered  from outside,  with  no
postulate of consciousness or person.” (p. 50). In this perspective, he examines Gestalt
theory, which he recognizes for going back “before the distinction between subject and
object.” (p. 78). While we can grant that in this theory there is no “primitive duality”
between the two, we cannot accept the mutilation of reality that it ends up proposing.
At the end of  the day,  there is  indeed a “progressive split  in two”,  an evolution,  a
development “that follows on from resolved difficulties or conflicts.” (p. 78). Instead of
this, Gestalt theory reunites object and subject in a whole that is constituted at every
instant by external and internal circumstances that “reciprocally choose each other.”
(1949, p. 57-58). It reunites them in a force field that is a “structure principle”, efficient
by coincidence, in the suddenness of circumstances. Here, we were able to speak of an
instantaneous genetism that gives rise to a state of stable balance where everything
that  could  happen does  (Simondon,  1989,  p. 46-49).  In  fact,  for  Wallon,  the  Gestalt
theory  –  of  great  interest  to  certain  movements  of  situated action concerned with
“lessening” the subject’s burden – “is a psychology where all that counts is successes
that are sufficient unto themselves. Preliminary attempts supposedly have nothing to
do  with  efficiency,  attempts  that  do  not  succeed  are  considered  as  non-existent.”
(p. 77). Yet, according to him, “even unfruitful attempts are not only negative. They
allow the prolongation of the acute phase of the act, that where non-success aggravates
the conflict between need, desire, emotional or vital necessity and the obstacle: this
leads  to  reconfiguration,  elimination  of  customary  reactions,  old  structures  and
regrouping into new structures.” (p. 77). In fact, Gestalt “indeed puts the spotlight on
the intervention as an original and creative fact, but it makes it into an absolute, a
miracle or pre-destination, removed from life, from psychic potential and no longer
finds its explanation there.” (p. 78).
44 Finally, for Wallon, consciousness psychology and situation psychology remain caught
up  in  the  subject/object  confrontation.  However,  “when  contradiction  becomes
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evident, it must be resolved. Avoiding it means doing quite the opposite. The easy way
out is to assimilate the two terms. Another is to eliminate one of them.” (p. 78). We
know that for Wallon, only activity simultaneously brings them together and opposes
them. It is in activity and activity alone that the relation between given and created as
well as functioning and development occurs. The formation of structure does not come
from above, as in Gestalt theory, nor is it one-sided as with Piaget. Instead, it rises from 
activity’s conflicts with the obstacle. Development comes out of these conflicts, in that
it  is  born  of them  and  moves  away  from  them.  The  invariant  thus  has  a  history
available to the subject. He/she moves beyond it when necessary and possible, not by
denying it but through the development of his/ her activity.
 
3.2. Development: repetition without repetition
45 Yet the way this development works does not easily enter frames of situated action
theories that alternate – or even oppose – stabilized routines of ordinary life and events
with no history. On one hand, repetitions, which become routines, are taken literally.
On the other, creation is seen as a break with the past, which takes on the various
attributes of “creationism”9. We could understand in this way the difference between
interactionist  approaches  in  situated  action  and  those  that  favor  affordance  and
distributed cognition. While the latter favor the invariance of situations, artifacts or 
group, the former insist on the creation of contexts by a focal event during interaction,
in line with intersubjective dynamics. (Grossen, 2001, p. 66).
46 Indeed,  carrying  out  any  action  supposes  the  presence  of  external  and  internal
invariants. But to put it like Leontiev, the formation of an action cannot be reduced to
the  formation  of  invariants,  particularly  because  it  is  not  the  result  of  it.  On  the
contrary:  they  are  the  product  of  actions  repeated  during  non-restorable  activities
(Leontiev, 1958, p. 176)10. Thus, invariants do not engender activity. They do not explain
it11.  On  the  contrary,  activity  deals  with  invariants.  Repetition  is  never  repetitive, 
(Bernstein, 1996; Fernandez, 2001) first because there is no invariant activated without
a history of activity that is specific each time; second, because each (specific) activity,
either in the form of consolidation or development, deals with the invariant repertory
(Clot, 2003, 2004).
47 Seen in this way,  action is  not so much situated in the situation as in the activity.
Obstacles, disagreements, objective, subjective or intersubjective conflicts encountered
in activity generate tension to varying degrees of intensity and invite the subject to
mobilize and develop invariants.  From the situation, action can – and often must –
come out. It is always situated but often between and in several situations, in a history
and  geography  of  the  activity  that  is  specific  each  time.  This  is  why,  if it  is  very
important  to  grant  a  central  action  organizing  function  to  an  invariant,  it  is  also
necessary to not ask too much of the already constructed. The inference of invariants
that  gives  form  to  action responds  to  the  interference  of  activities  in  changing
contexts, which are sources of variations.
 
3.3. Activity and interactivity
48 If there  is  no  activity  without  pre-organization  or  given,  likewise,  there  are  no
exchanges without initially shared signification. From this point of view, we could take
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up the classic idea of interactionism put forward by Schütz, according to which shared
significations, given beforehand for each person, are required for communication. But
on one condition: seeing communication as the transformation and real development
of required significations. As Vygotski indicated, “People only communicate with one
another  through  significations  in  proportion  to  the  development  of  significations”
(Leontiev, 2002, p 319).
49 We now understand better why the work of Bakhtin could be read as an alternative to
interactionism in a remarkable article by C. Bender (Bender, 1998, p. 193): “Dialogue is
not only possible, but perhaps enlivened when people do not share meaning. What we
share is not as interesting as what we don’t share.”
50 As a result, action supposes shared consciousness not only of a signification community
but  also  of the  different  meanings  each  person  attributes  to  these  significations.
Awareness of this difference is also required for communication. It is even the driving
force. As Vygotski indicated: “Signification does not coincide with logical signification
(That  which  does  not  have  meaning  has  a  signification)”  (Leontiev,  2002,  p. 310;
Vygotski, 2003). We can thus assume that the range of positions within heterogeneous
groups of actors constitutes not only a motor for development of their exchanges but 
more broadly a motor for the development of their activities (Béguin, 2004). We learn
by encountering something new, not from something shared.
51 For Bakhtin (1993), the subject –with the help of a shared given– participates in events
in a  particular  position that  is  his,  hers,  yours  or  mine and cannot be replaced by
anyone else. Unlike Blumer, for example, who claims that communication effected by
incomprehension  is  ineffective  and  the formation  of  the  corresponding  action  is
blocked (1969), Bakhtin considers incomprehension as the real source and conflict as
the motor of communication development. It is also the real source of comprehension
itself.  But  it is  true  then  that  we  must take  seriously  the  difference  between
intersubjectivity and subjectivity, between interaction and action, between activity and
interactivity.
52 Otherwise, yet again, we entrust the invariant of exchanges with engendering them, at
the risk of making their development incomprehensible. We are then constrained, as
Wallon would say, to turn development into a “miracle” or make do with the magic of
subjectivity  without  activity.  More  prosaically,  we  prefer  seeing  development  as  a
repetition pushed beyond repetition by the overcoming of contexts that renew directed
activity (Clot, 1999): a “repetition without repetition”. In this frame, the “right form”
would be less that of Gestalt theory than one that carries high tension and “judges itself
in  terms  of  the  quantity  of  obstacles  it  manages  to  conquer,”  to  use  Simondon’s
expression (1989, p. 53).
53 We can conclude with the remark by Shotter and Billig: In focusing only on what is
repeatable and essentially timeless, we talk of ourselves as studying events occurring
independently  of  ourselves  (1999,  p. 25).  It  is  never  the  case.  The  repeatable  is
paradoxically  always  unique.  All  in  all,  perhaps we  need  to  situate  action  in  the
development  of  activity  to  retain  the  virtues  of  creativity  and  inventiveness  that
French-speaking work analysis recognizes in action.
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NOTES
1. Let us note that situated action theories are also of interest to sociology. We will not deal with
this aspect in the text but readers may refer to Havelange (1991) or Joas (1999).
2. This point is nonetheless a subject of debate. We could refer to Vera and Simon (1993), for
example, who consider situational rationality as a type of rationality.
3. Let us note that other classifications are possible. For example, we could refer to Lave (1993) or
Salembier (1996). 
4. The status of the plan was not so clear in Suchman’s initial formulations. We could refer to
Visetti’s critical reading (1989) for discussion of this point. 
5. This exploitation may fail.  Repair mechanisms then come into play – Schegloff,  1984 – i.e.
exchanges that aim to reestablish a shared context. 
6. In opposition to a form of thought used for isolated or non-significant tasks, carried out as an
end in themselves. 
7. This  approach  also  interests  Vygotski’s  historical-cultural  approach.  It  thus  constitutes
grounds for debate between supporters of cognition and action situated theories and activity
theories (Cole, & Engeström, 1993; Kaptelinin, 1996; Rizzo, & Marti, 2000). 
8. It should be noted that this distinction does not correspond to that made by Vygotski between
technical tools and psychological tools. 
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9. As  Maurice  de  Gandillac  noted  about  the  adjective  “genetic”,  contrary  to  what  is  often
believed, “genesis is not the transcription of the Greek word génésis, from génesthai (become), but
that of the Greek word génnèsis, from génnao (engender)” (1965, p. 338). 
10. On this point, we can refer the reader to Piaget’s commentaries on Leontiev’s contribution to
the same symposium (Piaget, 1958, p. 199).
11. From this point of view, we will not follow G. Vergnaud and M. Récopé all the way, for whom,
beyond the organization of activity, the invariant seems to possess the function of engendering
(Vergnaud,  & Récopé 2000,  p. 46).  We thus can no longer see the role  –  that  they recognize
nonetheless – of “contingency” fundamental to this same activity in the formation of invariants.
ABSTRACTS
After briefly attempting to describe situated action and distributed cognition, we examine their
contributions from the point  of  view of  activity theories  and more specifically  based on the
relations between the functioning and development of activity. We argue that situated action
identifies a limit in cognitive psychology in seeking to bring the subject back into the situation
and in reintegrating him/her socially. However, in situating the organization of action outside
the  subject,  it  is  finally  the  characteristics  of  the  situation  that  explain  activity.  This
epistemological pendulum, already discussed by H. Wallon, does not allow an understanding of
the development of activity, nor the relation between what is given in the work situation and
what the actors create in the situation.
Après avoir brièvement tenté de rendre compte des différents courants de l’action située et de la
cognition distribuée, on examine leurs apports du point de vue des théories de l’activité, et plus
particulièrement  des  rapports  entre  fonctionnement  et  développement  de  l’activité.  On
argumente  que  l’action  située  en  cherchant  à  rapatrier  le  sujet  dans  la  situation,  et  en  le
réincarnant socialement, identifie une limite de la psychologie cognitive. Mais qu’en distribuant
les invariants de l’action à l’extérieur du sujet, ce sont les caractéristiques de la situation qui
expliquent l’activité. Ce balancier épistémologique, déjà été discuté par H. Wallon, ne permet pas
de rendre compte du développement de l’activité, ni du rapport entre ce qui est donné dans la
situation de travail et ce qui est créé dans la situation par les acteurs.
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